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COMMENTS
THE SUPREME COURT AND ZONING LEGISLATION
The constitutionality of municipal zoning ordinances in their
general scope and dominant features was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in a decision handed down
on November 22, 1926, in the case of the Village of Euclid, Ohio,
and Harry W. Stein, Inspector of Buildings for the Village of
Euclid, appellants, v. Ambler Realty Company.1 The case in-
volved the crux of the more recent zoning legislation, namely,
the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from
which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and
apartment houses are excluded. Upon this subject the Supreme
Court had not thus far spoken.
The question was before the Supreme Court on appeal from
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio.2 The highest court reversed the decree of the lower court
which had granted an injunction to the respondent against the
enforcement of the zoning law enacted by the Village of Euclid.
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the court. Mr.
Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice-
Butler dissented from the majority opinion.
The Village of Euclid is an Ohio municipal corporation. It
adjoins and practically is a suburb of the city of Cleveland. Its
estimated population is between 5,000 and 10,000, and its area,
from 12 to 14 square miles, the greater part of which is farm
lands or unimproved acreage.
Appellee owned a vacant tract of land containing 68 acres.
Adjoining his land on the east and on the west had been laid out
restricted residental plats upon which residences had been
erected.
On November 13, 1922, an ordinance was adopted by the vil-
lage council, establishing a comprehensive zoning plan for regu-
lating and restricting the location of trades, industries, apart-
ment houses, two-family houses, single family houses, etc., the
lot area to be built upon, the size and height of buildings, etc.
The entire village was divided by the ordinance into six
classes of use districts, denominated U-1 to U-6, incl.; three
classes of height districts denominated H-1 to H1-3, incl.; and
four classes of area districts, denominated A-1 to A-4, incl.
Appellee's land fell in the residential U-2 and U-3 districts, and
in the less desirable U-6 unrestricted use district.
171 L. Ed. (Adv.-).
2 297 Fed. 307.
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The ordinance was assailed by appellee on the ground that it
was in derogation of Sec. 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution in that it deprived appellee of liberty and prop-
erty without due process of law and denied it the equal protec-
tion of the law, and that it offended against certain provisions
of the constitution of the State of Ohio. The prayer of the bill
was for an injunction restraining the enforcement of the or-
dinance and all attempts to impose or maintain as to appellee's
property any of the restrictions, limitations or conditions. Ap-
pellee alleged that if allowed to sell and develop his land for in-
dustrial uses, it had a market value of about $10,000 per acre,
but if the use was limited to residential purposes the market
value was not in excess of $2,500 per acre; that the first 200
feet of the parcel had a value of $150 per front foot if unre-
stricted as to use, but if limited to residential uses, its value
was not in excess of $50 per front foot.
Appellee had made no effort to obtain a building permit or
apply to the zoning board of appeals for relief as it might have
done under the terms of the ordinance, but asked relief in this
action on the theory that the ordinance of its own force oper-
ated greatly to reduce the value of appellee's lands and destroy
their marketability for industrial, commercial, and residential
uses. Prospective buyers would be deterred from buying any
part of his land because of the existence of the ordinance and
the necessity of conducting litigation in order to vindicate the
right to use the land for lawful purposes, he alleged.
The court found the question to be decided under both the
United States and the Ohio constitution to be the same, namely:
"Is the ordinance invalid in that it violates the constitutional
protection to the right of property in the appellee by attempted
regulations under the guise of the police power, which are un-
reasonable and confiscatory?"
In answering this question, the court observed that "regula-
tions, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied
to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uni-
formly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.
The meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, but the
scope of their application must expand to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field
of their operation."
The court observed that the line of demarcation between
legitimate and illegitimate exercises of the police power varies
with circumstances and conditions, and that the law of nuisances
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might be consulted for helpful aid in ascertaining the scope of
the power. "A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."
The following were found to give rise to no serious difference
of opinion in respect of validity; namely regulation as to:
I. The height of buildings within reasonable limits.
II. The character of materials and methods of con-
struction of buildings.
III. The adjoining area which must be left open to
minimize the danger of fire, the evils of overcrowding,
etc.
IV. The exclusion from residential sections of of-
fensive trades, industries and structures likely to cre-
ate nuisances.
"The serious question in this case," said the court, "arises
over the provisions of the ordinance excluding from residential
districts, apartment houses, business houses, retail stores and
shops, and other like establishments." The decisions of the state
courts were found to be numerous and conflicting; those broadly
sustaining the power 3 greatly outnumbering those denying it
altogether or narrowly limiting it ;4 further that the constantly
increasing tendency was in the direction of the broader view.5
The court gives the following reasons for sustaining the
broader view:
3 The court cited the following cases as sustaining the power: Opinion
of Justices, 234 Mass. 597, 607, 127 N. E. 525; Inspector of Buildings v.
Stoklosa, 250 Mass. 52, 125 N. E. 262; Spector v. Building Inspector, 250
Mass. 63, 145 N. E. 265; Brett v. Building Comr., 250 Mass. 73, 145 N. E.
269; State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 282, 33 A. L. R. 260,
97 So. 440; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp. 229 N. Y. 313, 12&
N. E. 209; Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 93, 149 N. E. 784; Deynzer v.
Evanston, 319 Ill. 226, 149 N. E. 790; State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164
Minn. 146, - A. L. R. -, 204 N. W. 569; State ex r'el. Carter v. Harper,
182 Wis. 148, 157-161, 33 A. L. R. 269, 196 N. W%. 451; Ware v. Wichita,
113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99; Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477,
486-495, 38 A. L. R. 1479, 234 Pac. 381; Providence v. Stephens, - R. I. -,
133 Ati. 614.
4 For the contrary view see: Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 38
A. L. R. 1455, 128 Atl. 50; Ignaciunas v. Risley, 98 N. J. L. 712, 121 Atl.
783; Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 19 A. L. R. 1387, 235 S. W. 513.
5 For Court reversing former decisions see the following: State ex rel.
Deery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, - A. L. R. -, 204 N. W. 569, sustain-
taining the power, with State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn.
226, L. R. A. 1917F, 1050, 158 N. W. 1017; State ex rel. Roerig v. Min-
neapolls, 136 Minn. 479, 162 N. W. 477; and Vorlander v. Hokenson, 145
Minn. 484, 175 N. W. 995; denying it, all of which are disapproved in the
Houghton case (p. 151) last decided.
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I. Promotion of the health and security from injury of children and
others by separating dwelling houses from territory devoted to trade and
industry. Congestion of population is prevented, quiet residence districts
are secured, including a more favorable environment in which to rear
children; fewer nervous disorders are the result for young and old. Places
of business are noisy; they are apt to be disturbing at night; some of them
are malodorous; some are unsightly; some are apt to breed rats, mice,
roaches, flies, ants, etc.
II. Suppression and prevention of disorder. A more efficient distribu-
tion of patrolmen's beats is possible. Criminals and loiterers are more
open to suspicion in a restricted residential neighborhood.
III. Facilitating the extinguishment of fires and the enforcement of
street traffic regulations and other general welfare ordinances.
IV. Aiding the health and safety of the community by excluding from
residential areas the confusion and danger of fire, contagion and disorder
which in greater or less degree attach to the location of stores, shops and
factories.
V. The construction and repair of streets may be rendered easier and
less expensive by confining the greater part of the heavy traffic to the
streets where business is carried on. A cheaper pavement would suffice in a
restricted residence district.
VI. The development of detached house sections is greatly retarded
by the coming of apartment houses. Apartment houses in such sections
may be parasitic, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces
and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the
district. They interfere by their height and bulk with the free circulation
of air, monopolize the sun's rays, and bring as accompaniments the dis-
turbing noises incident to increased traffic and business.
VII. The fact that zoning has received much attention at the hands of
commissions and experts, whose investigations have been set forth in com-
prehensive reports; such reports bearing evidence of painstaking considera-
tion, and concurring in support of the foregoing.
VIII. The fact that the governing authorities presumably representing
a majority of the inhabitants of the village have spoken from which it
follows that if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur-
poses could be said to be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment should
be allowed to control.
It should not be lost sight of that the zoning ordinance was
here attacked upon the broad ground that its mere existence, by
adversely affecting values and curtailing opportunities of the
market, constituted a present and irreparable injury. In such
a case, said the court, it would not scrutinize its provisions
sentence by sentence to ascertain by process of piecemeal dis-
section whether it contained provisions of a minor character
or relating to matters of administration, or not shown to con-
tribute to the injury complained of, which, if attacked separately
might not withstand the test of constitutionality. The court
suggests that provisions of the ordinance when concretely ap-
plied to particular premises or conditions may be found to be
clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.
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To the reviewer the following facts seem to be patent. First,
the opinion is illuminative as a study in dynamic jurisprudence.
Precedents drawn from the days of the stage coach may be of
little service when it comes to the application of constitutional
precepts to the complex urban life of today. In this ever-
changing field of the police power, the court regards legal pre-
cepts as norms or guides to just results rather than as inflexible
molds.6 The law consists of rules, principles and standards.7
"This court has perceived the embarrassment which is likely to
result from an attempt to formulate rules or decide questions,
beyond the necessities of the immediate issue. It has preferred
to follow the method of a gradual approach to the general by a
systematically guarded application and extension of constitu-
tional principle, to particular cases as they arise, rather than
by out of hand attempts to establish general rules to which fu-
ture cases must be fitted."
Secondly, the court gives no indication in the case as to its
attitude toward the aesthetic in zoning regulations. It is often
said that the merits of zoning are presented in one light to the
citizens concerned and in an entirely different light to the courts.
There are three types of decisions on the aesthetic in zoning to
date. A few courts look upon zoning as unconstitutional because
an improper use of the police power for aesthetic purposes. s The
great majority of jurisdictions avoid the question of the aes-
thetic and base their decisions upon some provision in zoning
making for the promotion of the public health, safety or morals. 9
A third class of decisions frankly admit the aesthetic value of
zoning, but, nevertheless, recognize zoning regulations as a
proper exercise of the police power.10
It would seem that the dividing line between the aesthetic and
the utilitarian is not sharply defined and that they are not con-
trasted compartments of human motive or activity. There is
probably an aesthetic ingredient in almost every human action.
It would appear that the courts might well recognize the
aesthetic as one of the reasons for upholding zoning even though
6 Pound-The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24
Harvard Law Review 591.
7 Pound-The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 Harvard Law Review 641.
8 City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489. Spann v.
City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513.
9 City of Aurora v. Burns et al., 319 Ill. 84. Miller v. Board of Public
Works, (Cal. 1925) 234 Pac. 381. Baker, "Aesthetic Zoning Regulations,"
Mich. Law. Rev., Dec., 1926.
lo State ex rel. Carter v. Harper (Wis. 1925) 196 N. W. 451. State ex
rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440.
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promotion of beauty alone may not be sufficient to justify prop-
erty regulation.'1
Thirdly, inasmuch as the exercise of the police power deprives
the owner of property of a natural use of the property without
giving compensation for the loss, a rather broad distinction is
usually taken between the powers of taxation and eminent do-
main and the police power in that the latter cannot be used to in-
fringe on property rights unless a clear necessity exists, while
taxation and eminent domain need only be for a public use. It
has been suggested that one way of eliminating this rather ar-
tificial distinction would be to "concede the right to exercise
the police power with compensation in those border line cases
where any real distinction is well nigh impossible."'12 It is, how-
ever, believed that such an exception would introduce confusion
into the law of the police power, and that the amplification of
the exception might in time impose serious limitations on the
ability of urban communities to act wisely and beneficially.
What of the future? If an ordinance is good creating a dis-
trict of single family houses, why not an ordinance creating fur-
ther refinements,--say, a residence district in which homes are
to cost not less than $100,000? Apparently the answer to such
and related matters is to be found not in the laying down of
general rules and principles, but in the progress of community
thought and opinion. The application of the law making to
individual needs is to be considered, but in this dynamic sphere
of the police power especially, courts are showing a progressive
tendency to follow the thinking of living men and women.
J. H. ToELLE.
University of Montana Law School.
11 Bettman: "Constitutionality of Zoning," 37 Harvard Law Rev. 834.
12 Note and Comment, 28 Mich. Law Review 527.
